rigscore v0.6.3
Changes: v0.5.0 → v0.6.3
Three new checks. Thirteen total. Deeper detection across the board.
| Change | What it does |
|---|---|
| Claude settings check | Detects dangerous hook configs, enableAllProjectMcpServers, and skip-permissions |
| Credential storage check | Scans for credentials stored outside of env vars and secret managers |
| Unicode steganography check | Detects hidden text in skill files using Greek/Armenian/Georgian lookalikes, zero-width chars, and bidi overrides |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 mapping | Every finding tagged to ASI01–ASI10 taxonomy |
| CVE-specific patterns | Detection patterns tied to CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852, CVE-2025-54136 |
| Finding IDs | Stable checkId/slugified-title identifiers for suppression workflows |
--ignore flag | Suppress findings by title pattern at the CLI or via config |
| Shell history scanning | Checks ~/.bash_history and ~/.zsh_history for leaked secrets |
| SARIF physical locations | File paths extracted from findings for IDE integration |
| Fixer self-registration | Check modules own their fixers — no central registry |
| Weight rebalancing | Scoring recalibrated for 13-check distribution |
Three new checks
Claude settings (claude-settings) scans .claude/settings.json for configurations that expand attack surface. The dangerous ones: enableAllProjectMcpServers (loads MCP servers from any project without review), hooks that shell out to arbitrary commands, and skip-permissions mode. These settings exist for legitimate reasons — rigscore flags them as advisory so you’re making a deliberate choice, not an accidental one.
Credential storage (credential-storage) checks where credentials actually live. Env vars in the right files, committed secrets in the wrong ones. This complements the existing secret exposure check with broader pattern coverage.
Unicode steganography (unicode-steganography) checks skill files and CLAUDE.md for hidden characters. Greek lookalikes (α, ο, ρ) that render identically to Latin letters, zero-width joiners, bidirectional control characters — the attack surface from the ToxicSkills and Rules File Backdoor incidents. The check expands on what was already in the skill-files check, now covering Armenian and Georgian scripts and a full bidi override pattern set.
OWASP Agentic Top 10
Every rigscore finding now carries an OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) category tag — ASI01 through ASI10. This maps rigscore’s checks to the emerging standard taxonomy for AI agent security:
| Category | What rigscore covers |
|---|---|
| ASI01 Prompt Injection | Skill file injection patterns, CLAUDE.md integrity |
| ASI02 Excessive Agency | MCP server scope, enableAllProjectMcpServers |
| ASI03 Insecure Output | Governance contradictions, shell restrictions |
| ASI05 Supply Chain | MCP package pinning, typosquatting |
| ASI06 Sensitive Data | Secret exposure, credential storage, shell history |
| ASI08 Misinformation | Coherence contradictions |
The tags appear in JSON and SARIF output. If you’re running rigscore in CI and uploading SARIF to GitHub Advanced Security, the category now shows up in the security dashboard.
CVE-specific detection
Three CVEs from late 2025 / early 2026 are now in the pattern set:
- CVE-2025-59536 — Claude Code path traversal via malformed tool paths
- CVE-2026-21852 — MCP server SSRF via redirect chain in HTTP transport
- CVE-2025-54136 — Prompt injection via Unicode bidirectional override in skill files
These are compound patterns — the detector checks for the specific configuration conditions each CVE requires, not just keyword presence.
Finding IDs and suppression
Every finding now has a stable ID in the format checkId/slugified-title — for example, env-exposure/env-file-found-but-not-in-gitignore. These are consistent across runs on the same codebase.
Use them with --ignore to suppress findings you’ve accepted:
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Finding IDs also appear in SARIF output, making them usable as suppression keys in GitHub Advanced Security.
Install
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No accounts, no telemetry, no network calls. MIT licensed.
Configuration details reflect a production environment at time of writing. Implementation specifics vary based on tooling versions, platform updates, and organizational requirements. Validate approaches against current documentation before deployment.